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1 Introduction
As one of the most influential computing paradigms
in recent years, cloud computing not only noticeably
reduces capital expenditures, but also largely improves
computational efficiency, and thus successfully attracts
extensive attentions from both academia and industry.
As a result, cloud computing is widely used in vari-
ous IT services, including but not limited to, parallel
computing, visualization, network storage technologies,
load balance, utility computing, service-oriented etc.
Behind the great success and potential of cloud com-
puting, there is a big challenge to ensure its security.
Though cloud computing also involves other types of
security issues (e.g., data security), network security is
considered as one most prominent issue that must be
solved [6] [9] [36] [42] [12] [2]. Indeed, as stated by Na-
tional Vulnerability Database [15], there are 84 network
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vulnerabilities discovered in cloud computing by Febru-
ary 2013, all of which strongly threaten the security of
cloud computing. Other evidences [14] [10] [34] [41] also
reveal that malicious network attacks are responsible
to a large number of data destruction or tampering or
forgery in cloud computing. Unless network security in
cloud computing is properly ensured, all cloud comput-
ing based services are exposing to a high risk of attacks.
To protect network security, a traditional architec-
ture is to place network security devices (middleboxes
[8]) at front-end of cloud computing as shown in Fig. 1.
Though this traditional architecture addressed many
concerns in network security, it is faulted in several
important aspects. Lack of network security pro-
tection between virtual machines (VMs): Since a
compromised VM easily attacks other VMs in a same
hardware platform by virtual network [4] [39], How-
ever, the traditional architecture is lack of an internal
network protection mechanism between VMs. Diffi-
cult scalability : The traditional architecture presents
such a scenario: traffic bursts and exceeds the maxi-
mum capacity of the existing deployed middleboxes at
some points, while network traffic flows under normal
circumstances. If we add a number of corresponding
middleboxes to reduce traffic loss at peak load, it re-
sults in not only less efficient resource utilization, but
also higher deployment and maintenance costs. Diffi-
cult fault-tolerance: Using hot standby (HS) in the
traditional architecture can offer fault tolerance for the
failed middelboxes. However, one simple enterprise net-
work requires 640 middleboxes to protect its security
[32] [33], not to mention cloud computing that will host
much more complex multi-services end users. In cloud
computing, if we use the same hot standby to offer fault
tolerance for such a large volume of middleboxes, this
will result in unsustainable costs.
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Fig. 1: The traditional architecture network security for cloud
computing
Considering the above shortcomings of the tradi-
tional architecture, both industries and academies put
many efforts on alternative solutions. In industry, McAfee
Security-as-a-Service [27] merely provides Web and Email
security protection in cloud computing, and thus it is
lack of comprehensive multi-service protection in cloud.
Amazon Web Services [16] only provides basic network
security via a port-based firewall, and relies on third-
party security vendors to provide robust network secu-
rity with the granularity, control and reporting what
customers need. VMware vShield (app, endpoint, edge,
zones) [24] provides services in cloud with partial net-
work security protection, but it is short of comprehen-
sive and integrated capacity (e.g., encryption transmis-
sion, anti-virus). Security as a Service (SecaaS) [21]
provides services in cloud with comprehensive security
protection, including web, email and intrusion SecaaS,
but it fails to include scalability and system fault-tolerance.
In academia, Wu et al. [40] aim to control the inter-
communication among virtual machines with higher se-
curity by an embedded firewall in virtualized environ-
ment, but this method neither prevents malicious at-
tacks from external traffic, nor provides flexible scal-
ability and fault tolerance for the firewall. Salah et
al. [31] propose a cloud-based security overlay network
as a comprehensive protection solution for servers and
end-users, but it is also lack of an effective scalability
and fault-tolerance mechanism. Split/Merge [30] can be
dynamically scaled out (or in) virtual middleboxes in
cloud computing by SDN [11], which only focuses on
load-balanced elasticity and system utilization without
paying attention to preventing external and internal
malicious traffic from attacking cloud services. [33] [28]
well combine middleboxes with SDN to protect enter-
prise network security, and to provide a flexible scal-
ability and fault-tolerance mechanism, but it is a pity
that they are not suitable for cloud security.
Since it is not suitable or defective for the above
efforts to protect network security of cloud computing,
we propose a NetSecCC architecture that takes a novel
approach of eliminating these disadvantages. It not only
prevents external and internal malicious attacks and of-
fers on-demand network security service for cloud users,
but also is able to provide flexible scalability and fault
tolerance for virtual middlebox load and failure, respec-
tively. Experiments have further fully proved that Net-
SecCC has high performance in terms of scalability and
fault tolerance, and also provides security services for
cloud computing without much degraded system per-
formance. In summary, our main contributions are as
follows:
• An innovative architecture NetSecCC is a novel
scalability and fault-tolerant security architecture
using a systematic approach to properly provide se-
curity protection for cloud computing. The archi-
tecture provides balanced scalability alongside VM
scale-in and scale-out for virtual middleboxes ac-
cording to their loads, and offers many-to-one fault-
tolerant mechanism to overcome disadvantages of
the traditional HS for virtual middlebox failure.
• External and internal protection NetSecCC pre-
vents malicious attacks from not only external traf-
fic, but also internal traffic to ensure network secu-
rity of cloud users’ services in cloud computing.
• On-demand network security services NetSecCC
provides on-demand network security services for
different network security requirements from differ-
ent services on cloud computing.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2
provides an overview of the design of NetSecCC. Sec-
tion 3 gives implementation details of the entire system.
Section 4 shows various experimental results for eval-
uating the impact and performance of our system. We
conclude our paper in Section 5.
2 Design
Before describing the NetSecCC design, we assume
that hardware platform, hypervisor and VMs-OS on
cloud computing are trusted, and just focus on network
security of services placed on cloud computing. thereby
ensuring that traffic arriving at services in service do-
mains is secure and trusted.
2.1 Principle
In order to prevent external and internal malicious
traffic from attacking cloud users’ services in cloud com-
puting, incompetence external traffic from Internet or
internal traffic from VMs must be forwarded through a
desired sequence of security groups in SMG (e.g., FW-
WAF) to be inspected and filtered before arriving at
services in service domains §(2.2).
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MD, as a SDN controller, collects state information
(e.g., load, failure) from every group in SMG, and re-
ceives forwarding information (e.g., traffic) from vSwich
in a timely manner, and generates and issues forward-
ing rules to vSwitch according to SIC mapped by net-
work security requirements of cloud users’ services (To
simplify, we call it SIC of cloud users’ services) §(2.2),
security domains topology, state information and for-
warding information. VSwitch, as an openflow switcher
forwards external traffic from Internet and internal traf-
fic from VMs through the corresponding SIC according
to forwarding rules in vSwtich. SMG, as a performer is
comprised of various security groups (e.g., WAF group),
and is responsible for filtering and inspecting incoming
traffic before it is forwarded to service domains.
Preventing external and internal malicious
attacks Incompetence external traffic from Internet or
internal traffic from VMs, before arriving at services
in service domains, must be forwarded through SMG,
thereby ensuring services security. To make this process
concrete, as shown in Fig. 2, we use the Web server in
service domains as an example to elaborate the process-
ing. When external traffic accesses to the Web server,
it goes through NIC-FW-WAF-Web presented by blue
areas to ensure that traffic arriving at the Web server
is secure and trusted. When internal traffic from FTP
domains accesses to Web server, it must go through
FTP-FW-WAF-Web presented by red areas.
Scalability and fault tolerance Traffic is required
to go through one or more security groups, each group
on SIC path may suffer overload or low load or failure,
so a scalable and fault-tolerant security architecture re-
quires load-balanced dynamic elasticity and high avail-
ability in every group as shown in §(2.3). MD dynami-
cally adjusts forwarding rules in vSwtich to achieve the
purpose of load balancing and fault tolerance in each
group, and updates rules in the following two stages:
Initial phase, when cloud users employ their services in
service domains before not running, MD generates for-
warding rules in accordance with SIC of cloud users’
service, security domains topology and current mid-
dleboxes load; Running phase, when middelboxs suffer
overload or low load or failure, MD updates forward-
ing rules in vSwtich to rebalance middleboxes load for
overload or low load, and provide fault tolerance for
failure.
Compared with the traditional architecture, it can
be observed from the NetSecCC work principle that
it not only prevents external and internal malicious at-
tacks and offers on-demand network security service for
cloud users, but also is able to provide flexible scalabil-
ity and fault tolerance for virtual middlebox load and
failure. The focus of NetSecCC design is on-demand
network security service and scalability and fault-tolerance
of each group in SMG. SIC of cloud users’ services fo-
cuses on on-demand security service (§2.2), while flexi-
ble scalability and efficient fault tolerance in each group
(§2.3) can enhance load balancing and high availability,
and improve resource utilization.
2.2 SIC
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Fig. 2: Security Inspection Chains
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Table 1: NetSecCC ’s components and functions
Component Function
Dom0
• weaken dom0 privileges, it has
no permission to create/start and
stop/destroy any domain in SMG.
• dom0 still keeps such permissions to
do with all domains in service domains
and SMD, and manages resources,
including scheduling time-slices, I/O
quotas, etc.
SMD
It is composed of management domain
(MD) and event and log management do-
main (ELMD). ELMD stores and manages
events and logs from SMG, and provides
the unified query for security managers.
MD is responsible for three main func-
tions:
• create/destroy any domain in SMG.
• collect state information (e.g., load,
failure) from every group in SMG and
receive forwarding information (e.g.,
traffic) from vSwich.
• generate and update forwarding rules
in vSwtich according to security in-
spection chains (SIC) §(2.2), secu-
rity groups topology, virtual middle-
box load and failure.
SMG
It is comprised of various security meta-
groups (e.g., WAF group, IDS group, AV
group). Every group includes one or more
of virtual middleboxes of the same type
(To simplify, we also call these virtual
middleboxes security domains). Note that
each virtual middlebox is installed in a
standalone VM.
• Security domains are responsible for
traffic security inspection and filtering.
• provide fault tolerant for the failed se-
curity domains by the improved Hot
Standby (HS).
Service
Domains
It hosts various types of Internet-based
cloud users’ services (e.g., FTP server,
Web server).
vSwtich
It is responsible for receiving forwarding
rules from MD, and forwarding external
and internal traffic through security do-
mains to be filtered and inspected.
SIC is a sequence of logical policy chains through
one or more security groups (e.g., FW-WAF, FW-IDS),
traffic accessing to service domains must be forwarded
through the corresponding SIC to ensure the security of
service domains. NetSecCC is able to provide suitable
SIC for different network security requirements from
different services, i.e., on-demand security service as
shown in Fig. 3. Note that many middleboxes are state-
ful and need to process both directions of a session for
correctness. To make this discussion concrete, we use
two examples to further illustrate SIC.
Web server in service domains needs to solve these
attacks from network-layer and application-layer. At-
tacks from network-layer include DDOS attack, syn at-
tack, etc. Attacks from application-layer includes cross-
site attacks, SQL injection, vulnerability overflow and
so on. NetSecCC provides Web server security with SIC
(FW-WAF) as shown in Fig. 3 with yellow lines, Web
traffic must flow through FW and WAF to ensure the
security of Web server, where FW group assures its
network-lay security, WAF group offers its application-
layer security, thereby ensuring that traffic reaching
web service is secure.
Email server security requirements are able to
protect against DDOS attack, syn attack, malicious e-
mail, spam and virus e-mail, etc. Even the important
emails need to be encrypted for transmission. NetSecCC
provides email server with SIC (FW-AS-SSL/VPN), in-
dicated in Fig. 3 with red lines, to guarantee its secu-
rity. Where FW group secures network-layer security of
email server, AS group filters malicious and spam e-mail
to guarantee application-layer security, and SSL/VPN
group provides the important emails with secure trans-
mission.
2.3 Group Management
Incompetence external traffic from Internet or in-
ternal traffic from VMs accesses to services in service
domains, MD as a SDN controller is responsible for con-
trolling traffic to follow its corresponding SIC. While
each group on SIC path is a real performer on security
inspection and filtering, preventing malicious and virus
attacks from arriving at services in service domains. In
this process, when security domains (nodes) in some
groups on SIC path suffer overload or low load or fail-
ure, NetSecCC needs to rebalance load in groups for
overload or low load to strengthen network traffic pro-
cessing capability, including increasing throughput and
resource utilization, and to provide fault tolerance using
hot standby for failure to improve seamless inspection
and filtering, including reducing system recover time.
Note that the HS is not a traditional one-to-one rela-
tionship [5] [38] [3] between active nodes and standby
nodes, but a improved many-to-one relationship, that
is, the state information of all active nodes is synchro-
nized to one standby node to improve resource utiliza-
tion.
When one group faces traffic overload or low load
or node failure, as shown in Fig. 4, NetSecCC presents
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Fig. 3: Working mechanism of every group in SMG
how to deal with such a problem. MD collects and re-
ceives load and traffic information (e.g., session, load)
from active nodes in real time (1); In the case of these
active nodes overload or low load, MD makes such a
determination according to the received information: If
the load of the active nodes is not balanced, MD re-
news forwarding rules in vSwitch to adjust the load be-
tween the active nodes (4). If all active nodes overload,
MD creates an active node (2), and dynamically gener-
ates new forwarding rules and renews those in vSwitch
(4) to balance the load in active nodes. If active nodes
face low load, MD may destroy an active node (2), and
renew forwarding rules in vSwitch (4) to improve re-
source utilization. To make load balancing contrate, we
present from Fig. 4 how MD adjusts flow table to re-
balance load. Initially, WebID1 and WebID2 traffic is
forwarded to node1 and node2, respectively, to be in-
spected and filtered. If WebID3 traffic arrives and goes
through node1 and node2, they overload, so MD cre-
ates node3 and adds forwarding rules to route WebID3
traffic to node3. When WebID3 traffic ends, MD deletes
rules forwarding traffic to node3 and destroys node3.
Since most middleboxes are stateful, a middelbox
fails to result in loss of the established sessions in its
memory. If a client accesses to the remote server again,
the rebooted middlebox needs to reestablish a new ses-
sion between client and server, resulting in a large la-
tency. Although the traditional HS is able to solve this
problem by one-to-one switch-over between active nodes
and standby nodes, too many standby nodes seriously
reduce resource utilization. Because the probability of
middlebox failure is low, NetSecCC uses many-to-one
mapping relationship between all active nodes and one
standby node, that is, the state information in all ac-
tive nodes is synchronized to a same standby node.
When any active node fails, an automatic switch-over is
achieved between the failed active node and the standby
node, the standby node immediately plays the role of
the active node, and MD changes forwarding rules to
route traffic from the failed active node to the switched
standby node. The improved HS not only overcomes a
long latency to reboot the failed middlebox, but also
improves system resource utilization. In a specific ex-
ample as shown in Fig. 4, when node1 suddenly fails,
node4 immediately plays the role of node1 by switch-
over, and changes forwarding rules in vSwitch to route
traffic from WebID1 to node4. This process is done au-
tomatically without human involvement. A more de-
tailed process will be shown in Section 3.2.
3 Implement
The above design elaborates the principle of Net-
SecCC. In this section, we represent the implementation
of NetSecCC in detail. In regard of the implementation
of NetSecCC, we focus on the implementation of MD
and security group. MD provides the corresponding SIC
for cloud users’s services placed on cloud computing
to ensure their network security, and dynamically ad-
justs load balancing in security groups according to the
load information. Security groups not only perform se-
curity inspection and filtering, but also improve quality
of security service, including resource utilization, fault
tolerance, high availability. We first demonstrate the
implementation of MD.
3.1 MD Implement
During the implementation of NetSecCC, MD as a
SDN controller plays two important roles: First, it con-
trols traffic through the corresponding SIC of cloud
users’ services to ensure these services security. Sec-
ond, it rebalances load due to traffic overload or low
load or node failure in each group. MD implements its
two functions by forwarding rules in vSwitch, and the
process of implementation is shown in Fig. 5. Resource
manager sorts and analyzes these data from the inputs:
state information from groups in SMG (e.g., CPU, ses-
sion) and forwarding information from vSwitch, groups
topology and SIC, and outputs the parameters as the
inputs of RouteGen. RouteGen converts these parame-
ters into forwarding rules by forwarding traffic through
groups in SMG to be inspected and filtered. Until de-
ployment of new services or security needs change in
service domains, traffic overload or low load or node
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failure in groups, MD will not generate or renew rules
in vSwitch.
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Fig. 4: MD implementation
Web server (Web security chains FW-WAF) as an
example presents its forwarding rules by MD, as shown
in Fig. 5. External traffic from a client to the Web server
and internal traffic from the FTP server to the Web
server are first forwarded to FW by vSwtich to be fil-
tered, then forwarded to WAF to be inspected, and fi-
nally arrive at the Web server, thereby ensuring that
traffic arriving at Web server is secure and trusted.
3.2 Security Group
MD described above, as a controller, performs net-
work security inspection and filtering for network-based
services in cloud computing, while security groups are
regarded as an actual operator to put into effect specific
security inspection. As shown in Fig. 6, we elaborate the
implementation of security group in detail by focusing
on load balancing and fault tolerance of each group in
SMG. We first dwell on the cooperation between MD,
active nodes and vSwitch to implement load balancing
between active nodes. Fig. 6(a) shows their communi-
cation and work sequence.
1. MD
ReqMessagequery(IDNode)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1a
active nodes: IDNode de-
notes the current active node identifier, MD send a
query message to all active nodes.
2. Active nodes
ResMessagequery(IDNode,CPU,memory)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1b
MD:
All current active nodes respond to the respec-
tive state information including CPU utilization,
memory usage, sessions, etc.
3. vSwitch
ReqMessagereport(vSwitch)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2a
MD: vSwitch peri-
odically reports the number of packets and flow size
through active nodes to MD.
4. MD
ResMessagereport(vSwitch)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2b
vSwitch: MD responds
the report message to vSwitch.
5. LB algorithm: Alg (the number of packets, flow size,
CPU, memory, session, etc) (3a). Note: the cur-
rent popular algorithms, for example round
robin, dynamic server act and dynamic ratio-
APM, may be used as the load balancing al-
gorithm. Since the article focuses on security
architecture of cloud computing, load balanc-
ing algorithm will not be described too much.
6. MD
ReqMessagerelease(vSwitch)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4a
vSwitch: MD issues for-
warding rules to vSwitch according to LB algorithm.
7. vSwitch
ResMessagerelease−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4b
MD: vSwitch responds to
MD for the release message.
Next, as show in Fig. 6(b), the communication and
work sequence between active nodes and standby node
will be elaborated to prepare for fault-tolerant on ac-
count of any active node failure.
1. Active or standby node
ReqMessageheartbeat(IDNode)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1a
standby or active node: they probe each other to
determine whether the other is alive.
2. Standby or active node
ResMessageheartbeat(IDNode)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
1b
active or standby node: they respond to each other
probes.
3. Active node
ReqMessageinform(IDNode,state,session)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2a
standby
node: The renewed information (such as state, ses-
sion) is replicated from active nodes to standby node
in real time.
4. Standby node
ReqMessageinform(IDNode)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
2b
active node:
Standby node responds to active nodes for the re-
newed message.
Finally, as show in Fig. 6(b), Hot Standby switch-
over processing will be explained in accordance with an
active node failure, and the sequence and communica-
tion between MD and standby node will be present to
implement fault-tolerance. That is, if any active node
fails, the standby node immediately plays the role of
that failed active node.
1. Standby node
ReqMessagereplace(IDactive,IDstandby)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
3a
MD:
if probing that the active node has failed, the standby
node sends a replacement message to MD to switch
over between the active node and the standby node.
2. MD
ResMessagereplace−−−−−−−−−−−−→
3b
Standby node: MD responds to
the standby node for switch-over.
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3. MD
ReqMessagerelease(vSwitch)−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4a
vSwitch: MD renews for-
warding rules to vSwitch after switch-over. The standby
node becomes the active node responsible for in-
specting and filtering the received traffic.
4. vSwitch
ResMessagerelease−−−−−−−−−−−−→
4b
MD: vSwitch responds to
MD for the renewed message.
To summarize, MD guides security groups to put
into effect security inspection for traffic, thereby ensur-
ing that traffic arriving at service domains is secure and
trusted, while security groups are the specific imple-
menter of security inspection. They complement each
other to achieve security protection of cloud comput-
ing.
4 Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate NetSccCC with the fol-
lowing goals:
• evaluate NetSecCC ’s ability to prevent external and
internal malicious traffic from attacking cloud users’
services (§4.1).
• evaluate NetSecCC ’s ability to provide dynamic scal-
ability to complex real world middleboxes, and mea-
sure the gain in resource utilization when scaling in
a deployment with NetSecCC (§4.2).
• evaluate NetSecCC ’s fault-tolerance ability compared
with three different fault-tolerance cases when one
or more of the active nodes fail (§4.3).
• quantify system overhead with NetSecCC compared
with the case without security protection in cloud
computing (§4.4).
Experimental environment Cloud platform was con-
ducted on a Dell Server with 8 core, 3.42 GHz Intel
Table 2: The list of open source security middleboxes
Middlebox Name Open Source Software
FW IPFire [7]
WAF ModSecurity [13]
SSL/VPN OpenSSL [20]
AS PacketFence [35]
CPU, 16GB memory. The XEN hypervisor version is
3.4.2, the dom0 system is fedora 16 with kernel version
2.6.31. We used a 64bit fedora Linux with kernel ver-
sion 2.6.27 as guest OS, vSwitch bandwidth is 1 Gigabit
Ethernet; NetSecCC uses open source security middle-
boxes as shown in Table 2.
4.1 Protection
Table 3 shows NetSecCC ’s ability to prevent exter-
nal and internal malicious traffic from attacking Web
server in service domains. Our experimental environ-
ment is that a Web server [26] was installed on a stan-
dalone VM in service domains, we have simulated dif-
ferent types of malicious external traffic from Internet
and internal traffic from other VMs generated by attack
tools (e.g., SQL Inject Me, HackBar), as shown in Table
3, to attack the Web server. Three scenarios are com-
pared to protect against these malicious attacks: Net-
SecCC, Wu et al. that control the inter-communication
among virtual machines with higher security by the em-
bedded firewall in virtualized environment, and the tra-
ditional architecture that places network security mid-
dleboxes at front-end of cloud computing to protect
their network security, as shown in Fig. 1.
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Table 3: Comparison results of the three protection: Wu et al. just prevent malicious internal traffic between VMs; the
traditional architecture is just able to prevent malicious external traffic; While NetSecCC can address the attacks from
external and internal traffic.
Vulnerability Attack Tool
Wu et al. [40] Traditional Architecture NetSecCC
Ext. Int. Ext. Int. Ext. Int.
Cross-site scripting ZAP [25] × √ √ × √ √
Cross-site request forgery ZAP × √ √ × √ √
Input validation Nikto/Wikto [19] × √ √ × √ √
SQL injection SQL Inject Me [22] × √ √ × √ √
Information leak Tamper Data [23] × √ √ × √ √
Authentication issues HackBar [17] × √ √ × √ √
Path traversal HackBar × √ √ × √ √
The results of experiments are shown in Table 3.
The solution provided by Wu et al. is just able to pro-
tect inter-communication between virtual machines in
the same platform. However, it can not protect against
external malicious attacks. The traditional architecture
is now a popular way to provide protection for external
network security of cloud computing, but it can not pro-
tect internal communication between virtual machines,
thus resulting in the serious problem that the malicious
virtual machine can attack and control the other vir-
tual machines in the same platform to destroy the entire
cloud system. While NetSecCC, in the contrary, pro-
tects against not only malicious attacks from external
traffic, but also attacks from internal traffic to ensure
network security of cloud users’ services in cloud com-
puting, thus overcoming the shortcomings of Wu et al.
and the traditional architecture.
4.2 Scalability
Fig. 7(a) shows NetSecCC ’s ability to dynamically
scale WAF out and in during a load burst. Our experi-
mental environment is that a Web server is installed on
a standalone VM in service domains, 30 clients in the
form of a continuous sequence of POST requests access
to the Web server, the requests contain SQL injection
and cross-site scripting attacks, and each client gener-
ates 80 requests/second. We inject a load burst 50 sec-
onds into the experiment by introducing an additional
30 clients, and the load burst lasts 40s. Three scenarios
are compared: a single WAF instance that handles the
entire load burst, a pair of WAFs that share load (flows
are assigned to each WAF in a round-robin fashion)
and NetSecCC. NetSecCC scenario begins with a sin-
gle WAF. When overloaded, NetSecCC creates a new
WAF to split Web traffic.
As shown in Fig. 7(a), until the load burst at t =
50s, all the three scenarios have a 100% detection rate.
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Fig. 6: Scaling security groups out and in to test NetSecCC ’s
scalability according to traffic overload and low load
During the load burst, the performance of the single
WAF degrades drastically because packets are dropped
and attacks are missed. The two WAFs do not expe-
rience any degradation as they have enough capacity
and the load is well balanced between the two WAFs.
While NetSecCC creates a new WAF to split Web traf-
fic according to the load burst at t = 50s, the following
problem is caused: packets are dropped and attacks are
missed. However, the detection rate quickly rises be-
cause the two WAFs have enough capacity for the load
burst. After the load burst (t = 90s), NetSecCC de-
tects a drop in load due to the destroying of one WAF.
NetSecCC therefore enables WAF to handle the load
burst without wasting resources by running two WAFs
throughout the entire experiment.
Fig. 7(b) shows system utilization between NetSecCC
and a pair of FWs that share load in a round-robin
fashion. Our experimental environment is that a UDP
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server is installed on a standalone VM in service do-
mains, 100 UDP clients continuously send UDP pack-
ets to the UDP server, and each client evenly generates
from 8M requests/second to 1M requests/second within
100s in the descending way. Initially, NetSecCC has two
FWs to share UDP traffic. When traffic declines, in the
first 50s, the system utilization of NetSecCC is the same
as that of this pair of FWs, decreased from 80% to 50%.
However, NetSecCC utilization burst reaches 80% at t
= 50s, this is mainly because that NetSecCC is config-
ured with a scale-in policy that is triggered once one
FW load falls below 50. That is, at low load, one FW is
destroyed, and all traffic is forwarded to the other FW.
That is, at this moment, only one FW in NetSecCC is
responsible for filtering and inspecting all traffic, while
a pair of FWs remain two FWs, thereby improving sys-
tem utilization. After 50s, NetSecCC ’s system utiliza-
tion decreases from 80% to 20% with gradually decreas-
ing traffic, while the system utilization of this pair of
FWs decreases to 10%.
4.3 Fault Tolerance
One dynamic scenario is considered in Fig. 4. When
node3 fails, it is needed to recover the normal running
network, and what we are interested in is the recovery
time [37]. Three scenarios are compared: Remus [1], RP
[29] and NetSecCC. The following shows three different
fault-tolerance configurations:
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Fig. 7: Recovery time in the case of a virtual middlebox failure
Remus uses a VM-level fault-tolerance technique
that provides transparent failure recovery. The flow state
of node3 is constantly replicated by Remus to node4 in
the same group, and node3’s passive backup copy cre-
ated by Remus is denoted as node3-B. When node3
failure is detected, Remus creates node3-B, and con-
stantly replicates the flow state of node3 from node4 to
node3-B, and vSwitch forwards the flows accordingly to
node3-B.
RP uses a fine-grained flow-level fault-tolerance tech-
nique. When node3 fails, the flow state of node3 is con-
stantly replicated by RP to node1 and node2 in the
same group, and the SDN controller immediately acti-
vates the relevant flow states in node1 and node2 and
vSwitch forwards the flows accordingly.
Fig .8 shows recovery time of each fault-tolerance
strategy, including failure detection time, flow state repli-
cation time, creation VM time and rule update time.
In regard of Remus, the overhead is prohibitively high,
and the main overhead comes from the flow state repli-
cation and the creation VM. Where the time overhead
of the creation VM is the time to establish VM and mid-
dlebox, the root cause of the performance degradation
during the flow state replication arises from suspend-
ing and resuming the entire VM by a VM-level fault-
tolerance technique. In regard of PR, the recovery time
is very close to approximate 5ms, its main overhead
also comes from the flow state replication. This is due
to the fact that in order to failover a set of flows of
the failed node to the active nodes without disrupting
end-to-end connectivity, when finding node failure, PR
takes a long time to replicates relevant flow states. In
regard of NetSecCC, during the operation, the new and
renewing flow state of the active nodes has being syn-
chronized to the standby node in a timely manner, so
NetSecCC ’s fault tolerance overhead just takes failure
detection time and rule update time, thus reflecting a
higher recovery efficiency.
4.4 Performance Overhead
To evaluate NetSecCC ’s system performance over-
head, throughput and latency that are important in-
dicators of system performance are used as evaluation
criteria. Although this way without NetSecCC is higher
efficient than one with NetSecCC, if no protective mea-
sures are taken to protect cloud computing security, it
may lead to incalculable losses. Therefore, it is neces-
sary to protect network security of cloud computing to
defend various attacks from the network. Even if Net-
SecCC is selected to protect cloud computing security,
it is also necessary to consider whether its performance
overhead can be accepted. IXIA [18] is used as a perfor-
mance testing tool to evaluate NetSecCC ’s performance
overhead, comparing both with and without network
security in cloud computing. Next, Two experiments
are used to evaluate the performance impact with Net-
SecCC.
For Web page access as our first experiment, IXIA
is used both as a customer and as a server to test with
and without NetSecCC. The results of this experiment
show in Fig. 9 that NetSecCC has little impact on
system performance, compared with the case without
NetSecCC, NetSecCC imposes 9.3% of average latency
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overhead (ranging from 6.4% to 13.9%) and 0.4% of av-
erage throughput drop(ranging from 0 to 3.7%). There
are two main reasons. First, since SIC (FW-WAF) of
web page access is composed of FW group and WAF
group, Web traffic must go through FW group and
WAF group to be inspected and filtered before being
forwarded to the Web server in service domains. In this
process, traffic is required to match hundreds of filter-
ing rules in FW and thousands of signatures in WAF.
This will take some time, resulting in the increased la-
tency and the decreased throughput. Second, since FW
group and WAF group share the same hardware re-
sources (e.g., CPU, memory) in the same virtual plat-
form, context switches between FW group and WAF
group cause cache invalidations, which is very expen-
sive. In the case without NetSecCC, Web traffic directly
accesses to the Web server to avoid inspection in terms
of system overhead. Therefore, compared with the cases
without NetSecCC, latency becomes longer with Net-
SecCC, throughput is suffered from the impact of la-
tency, but overall system performance with NetSecCC
is within the acceptable range(≤ 9.3%).
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Fig. 8: Performance comparison results of cases with Net-
SecCC and without NetSecCC by Web page access
For Email access as our second experiment, IXIA
is used to test performance overhead with NetSecCC.
The results of this experiment show in Fig. 10 that even
encrypted emails with NetSecCC are just slightly af-
fected. Compared with the case without NetSecCC,
specific data with NetSecCC on the performance over-
head is shown below: the average cost of latency is
11.1% (ranging from 9.2% to 13.7%), and the average
cost of throughput is 5% (ranging from 0 to 11.1%).
For security services, such a performance overhead (≤
11.1%) is perfectly acceptable.
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Fig. 9: Performance comparison results of cases with
NetSecCC and without NetSecCC by mail access
In summary, by the comparison of two cases both
with and without NetSecCC in cloud computing, Net-
SecCC is able to provide adequate network security
protection for cloud computing, but not at the cost of
sacrificing the high price of system performance. The
two experiments have further indicated that NetSecCC
scheme can provide efficient comprehensive network pro-
tection for cloud computing.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduce a novel solution Net-
SecCC to ensure network security in cloud computing.
In particular, this new solution is carefully designed to
provide protection against both external and internal
attacks, to provide flexible scalability and to achieve
high and effective capability of fault-tolerance. Our ex-
tensive experimental results validates all these charac-
teristics, and thus NetSecCC address the all three ma-
jor defects known in a traditional solution. It also pro-
vides a more comprehensive protection for cloud com-
puting, and opens a new door in network security re-
search.
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